deJAAA (Open Market Factory notes linked to JAAA)
Base: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
Arbitrum: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
BSC: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. Keys: transfer hook 0x9aab…1147.
Solana: can freeze a holder, mint. An account only a program can sign for can freeze a holder.
Avalanche: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
Monad: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. Keys: transfer hook 0x2a9b…1a61.
Stellar: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, mint, change the code.
This file replaced an earlier record on 2026-09-30. The file listed deJAAA on Stellar without a reading of who controls it: deJAAA there is a Soroban contract, which Ketju could not read. This version adds that reading, so a client wallet holding deJAAA on Stellar now matches this file. Superseded records.
Subscribers see which of their clients hold this program, each household’s answer against these terms, and an alert when the file changes. $49 per advisor per month, first 14 days free.
The verdict is on the memo: deJAAA (Open Market Factory notes linked to JAAA) Rejected
Who may buy, hold, transfer, and redeem
Each answer rests on the issuer’s own words, quoted from the document named under it. Ketju re-reads each document and records whether the words are still there. Where the documents say nothing, the row says so.
- What the holder owns
A note of Open Market Factory Limited that gives exposure to JAAA tokens; not a JAAA share and not a claim on Janus Henderson or Anemoy.
“The OMF Series 2 20-Year Variable Rate Tokenized Notes offer exposure to the underlying JAAA Tokens”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · pool.issuer.description · words found 2026-09-23
- Who may hold it
The pool sheet admits non-US persons and entities; the token itself lets any unfrozen wallet hold it.
“Non-US Persons and Entities”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Eligibility · words found 2026-09-23
- First purchase minimum
10,000 USD to subscribe through the vault; none to buy on a DEX.
“10,000 USD”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Min. investment · words found 2026-09-23
- Account types
Individuals and entities outside the United States.
“Non-US Persons and Entities”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · pool.investorType · words found 2026-09-23
- Who it may be transferred to
Freely transferable to any wallet that is not frozen.
“a freely transferable, fully onchain instrument linked to JAAA”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Overview · words found 2026-09-23
- How a holder redeems
Daily through the Centrifuge vault for members; any time on DEXes for everyone else.
“Daily via vault; tradable 24/7 on DEXes”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Liquidity · words found 2026-09-23
- Who keeps the official record
The documents read do not say which record governs the notes or who keeps it.
Not stated in Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain, Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and transfer hooks), Centrifuge: deRWA Tokens (read from the Internet Archive copy of 2026-05-11), Centrifuge: Centrifuge Brings deRWA to Millions on EVM (2025-08-20, read from the Internet Archive copy).
- What the issuer says it can freeze or take back
The Centrifuge platform, not the note issuer, states that frozen addresses cannot send or receive tokens.
“Account freezing - frozen addresses cannot send or receive tokens”
Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and transfer hooks) · Token compliance, Architecture · words found 2026-09-23
| Fact | What the file records |
|---|---|
| Who onboards the holder | issuer |
| Voting rights | None |
| Distributions | reinvested |
| SIPC coverage of the wallet | No |
Who can change the record
Powers read from the deployed contracts and their verified source: the token and every contract it consults on transfer. A power recorded here is the issuer’s ability, not evidence it has been used.
| Chain | Freeze a holder | Pause | Claw back | Gate holders | Change the code | Keys held by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| Base | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| Arbitrum | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| BSC | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | transfer hook 0x9aab…1147 |
| Solana | Yes | No | No | No | No | An account only a program can sign for can freeze a holder. |
| Avalanche | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| Monad | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | transfer hook 0x2a9b…1a61 |
| Stellar | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | GAZ4HCTWWUAMVV5RXMUARAO3CGJYA77DTKPOXF45BOXSOG6CJ2L4CWIK via mint_from |
Who holds the keys
Every current holder of each power, read from the chain on 2026-09-30. A single key is one private key: whoever holds it acts alone. A multisig needs the stated number of signers. A timelock makes every action wait, so holders can see it coming.
| Chain | Key | What it can do | Held by | Address |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Ethereum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Ethereum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| Ethereum | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Ethereum | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Base | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Base | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Base | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| Base | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Base | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Arbitrum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Arbitrum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Arbitrum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| Arbitrum | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Arbitrum | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Solana | Mint authority | mint new tokens | an account only a program can sign for | FBH7oW…Z66s |
| Solana | Freeze authority | freeze a holder | an account only a program can sign for | FkPfY4…E15d |
| Avalanche | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Avalanche | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Avalanche | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| Avalanche | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Avalanche | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
Role holders on BSC, Monad, Stellar could not be read from the public event indexes on the last reading; the table shows only what was confirmed.
Ethereum: 2 contract reads at block 26042499, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- freeze in verified source 0x9aab…1147
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- mint in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- file in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
Base: 2 contract reads at block 51702627, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- freeze in verified source 0x9aab…1147
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- mint in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- file in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
Arbitrum: 2 contract reads at block 508230324, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- freeze in verified source 0x9aab…1147
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- mint in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- file in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
BSC: 2 contract reads at block 123627534, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- freeze in verified source 0x9aab…1147
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- mint in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- file in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
Solana: 2 contract reads at block 449809604, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- mintAuthority=FBH7oWjXHXyUaj1wQFCvivbo95BMEXc3QuUaYzayZ66s
- freezeAuthority=FkPfY4i1zxHV5hepumE1c7GPXhpWhv3uYNgX2XRhE15d
Avalanche: 7 contract reads at block 96282327, 9 functions in verified source, 2026-09-27
- totalSupply()=0x000000000000000000000000000000e180681279
- decimals()=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000012
- eip1967.implementation=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- eip1967.admin=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- eip1967.beacon=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.FREEZE_BIT
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.freeze
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isFrozen
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isSourceOrTargetFrozen
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.unfreeze
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#authTransferFrom
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.onERC20AuthTransfer
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#mint
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#file
Monad: 9 contract reads at block 108571747, 9 functions in verified source, 2026-09-27
- totalSupply()=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- decimals()=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000012
- eip1967.implementation=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- eip1967.admin=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- eip1967.beacon=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- hook()=0x2a9b9c14851baf7ad19f26607c9171ca1e7a1a61
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- codehash(0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062)=0x7a690cd1827d39a5081bb79eb527a2de7d86b0cb23dd4aa6f3d074db8109e2a3=codehash(1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc)
- codehash(0x2a9b9c14851baf7ad19f26607c9171ca1e7a1a61)=0xcdfff1ca7526880041d2a7378e1fc700fafbc4496e9a7c62f93d0b7e71a61423=codehash(1:0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147)
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.FREEZE_BIT
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.freeze
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isFrozen
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isSourceOrTargetFrozen
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.unfreeze
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#authTransferFrom
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.onERC20AuthTransfer
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#mint
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#file
Stellar: 2 contract reads at block 64698169, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-30
- wasm=d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb
- get_admin()=GAZ4HCTWWUAMVV5RXMUARAO3CGJYA77DTKPOXF45BOXSOG6CJ2L4CWIK
- abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#block_user
- abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#pause
- abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#mint_from
- abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#upgrade
Where it trades
| Venue | Kind |
|---|---|
| Centrifuge deRWA vault (pool 281474976710659) | issuer primary |
| Aerodrome and other DEX pools | dex |
How it exits
| Path | Settlement | Settles in |
|---|---|---|
| Redeem with the issuer in its window | Members redeem through the Centrifuge vault, daily, for USDC or USDT at the published price; the vault also takes JAAA in | USDC, USDT |
| Secondary market only; no issuer redemption | DEX pools (Aerodrome on Base among them) and Morpho lending markets, open to any wallet that is not frozen | USDC |
- Open Market Factory Limited publishes the note terms or an offering document; the file is then re-read for the claim, the holder floor, the domicile, and the record
- The deJAAA hook changes from FreelyTransferable, or a freeze or authTransferFrom is used against a holder
- The note pool’s JAAA holdings, as shown by the Chronicle proof of asset, fall below the value of deJAAA outstanding
- The reader gains verified ABIs for Avalanche or Monad; those chains are then added
- JAAA itself changes its redemption terms, gates, or portfolio rules
What the monitor reads daily
Every control function in the table above and the contracts the token consults on transfer; the token’s on-chain supply against yesterday’s; and its market quote against yesterday’s quote, since a fund of this kind accrues a few basis points a day. Every document quoted above is re-read too, and a quote that leaves its document reopens the file. A key that appears, disappears, or changes shape counts as a change only when the chain’s own log shows the grant, revocation, or signer change between yesterday’s block and today’s; a difference the log does not show updates this file’s key list and nothing more. A change opens a review item in the governance queue and reopens the file before any client action. Subscribers get an email naming each of their clients who hold it, with the household result.
File history
Revised 2 times since it was filed. Each superseded copy is kept as published, with the reason it was replaced.
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | Filed. |
| 2026-09-27 | Revised. Superseded to add control readings on chains the file listed without one, so a wallet holding the token there matches the file and the daily watch reads it. The terms and the claim model did not change. |
| 2026-09-30 | Revised. The file listed deJAAA on Stellar without a reading of who controls it: deJAAA there is a Soroban contract, which Ketju could not read. This version adds that reading, so a client wallet holding deJAAA on Stellar now matches this file. |
Sources
- Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: issuer Open Market Factory Limited, OMF Series 2 20-Year Variable Rate Tokenized Notes, Non-US Persons and Entities, 10,000 USD minimum, daily vault liquidity, Chronicle proof of asset, underlying pool 281474976710663 - Centrifuge pool metadata for the Janus Henderson AAA CLO Fund (pool 281474976710663) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: underlying fund, Anemoy Capital SPC Limited, non-US professional investors - Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and transfer hooks) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: deJAAA contract addresses, freely transferable hook for deRWA, account freezing - Centrifuge: deRWA Tokens (read from the Internet Archive copy of 2026-05-11) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: wrapping service, freely transferable tokens, no minimums or onboarding in savings apps - Centrifuge: Centrifuge Brings deRWA to Millions on EVM (2025-08-20, read from the Internet Archive copy) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: deJAAA first deRWA asset, Aerodrome, Coinbase DEX, OKX, Bitget, Morpho - Verified FreelyTransferable hook on Ethereum (Blockscout) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: any non-frozen account may receive and transfer, membership only for deposit and redeem, freeze