Eligibility file · Mixed
Dinari dShares (tokenized US stocks and ETFs)
What the client owns
No title to the share: a claim to its value plus a contractual put against Dinari. Third-party synthetic: A note or swap that pays like the security and carries no rights in it.
Who may hold it
Not offered to US persons. First purchase minimum not stated. Regulation S terms (Section 7.1(g)); the United States is an Excluded Jurisdiction. Distributors run KYC on their end users unless they engage Dinari (Section 2.4); only KYC-passed holders may request a repurchase. A separate US brokerage route exists through Dinari Securities, LLC (CRD 329672), cleared by Alpaca. Its Form CRS says the customer may move the record token to a self-custody wallet they control (https://dinari.com/bd/crs). The partner guide still says issued US tokens are non-transferable, bars DeFi and wrapped dShares, and requires dedicated wallets tied to verified accounts (https://docs.dinari.com/docs/us). These documents conflict. The CRS does not grant transfers to other holders or state an allowlist. Part II of the customer agreement governs brokerage services; service-specific supplemental terms control conflicts (https://dinari.com/bd/terms, Part I Section 1 and Part II Section 1). No wallet-transfer supplement was verified. The global Regulation S token remains the program this file covers. The developer guide links an external wallet to an account by a signed nonce (https://docs.dinari.com/docs/managing-wallets). The TokenTransfer API accepts a recipient account ID and lets only accounts with Dinari-managed wallets initiate a transfer (https://docs.dinari.com/reference/createtokentransfers). Neither states a US recipient allowlist. For US fractional shares, the customer agreement bars in-kind transfers and requires sale followed by a wire of the proceeds (https://dinari.com/bd/terms, Section 20). Moving a record token under the CRS does not establish an exit to another holder. No US token redemption terms were verified. At Arbitrum block 510472741, sampled USFR still points to implementation 0xf971cd2516eae8bb197ee21987a8421069bd0a68. Its source calls phase-2 rules at the access-control contract for ordinary transfers, while the operator role bypasses the check. The interface tracks registration, restriction, block and whitelist flags (https://sourcify.dev/server/v2/contract/42161/0xf971cd2516eae8bb197ee21987a8421069bd0a68?fields=all). A read-only call allowed address 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001 to send to address 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000002; address 1 had no metadata flags (https://arb1.arbitrum.io/rpc). The rule facet had no verified source at the checked Sourcify and Blockscout endpoints. US customer flags and the full recipient rules remain unverified. This check does not prove a US wallet can transfer or give a holder a legal transfer right. The allowlist stays unverified; the other chain readings remain dated September 24.
Who can freeze or claw back
Arbitrum USFR: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, mint, change the code (allowlist unverified). A single key, through a contract, can claw back tokens and pause transfers and freeze a holder. A single key can change the code with no delay.
Base USFR: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, mint, change the code (allowlist unverified). A single key, through a contract, can claw back tokens and pause transfers and freeze a holder. A single key can change the code with no delay.
Ethereum USFR: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, mint, change the code (allowlist unverified). A single key, through a contract, can claw back tokens and pause transfers and freeze a holder. A single key can change the code with no delay.
Plume Mainnet USFR: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, change the code (allowlist unverified). A single key, through a contract, can claw back tokens and pause transfers and freeze a holder. A single key can change the code with no delay.
Base USFR: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, mint, change the code (allowlist unverified). A single key, through a contract, can claw back tokens and pause transfers and freeze a holder. A single key can change the code with no delay.
Ethereum USFR: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, mint, change the code (allowlist unverified). A single key, through a contract, can claw back tokens and pause transfers and freeze a holder. A single key can change the code with no delay.
Plume Mainnet USFR: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, change the code (allowlist unverified). A single key, through a contract, can claw back tokens and pause transfers and freeze a holder. A single key can change the code with no delay.
How it exits
Redeem with the issuer in its window. Sell order to Dinari; Dinari sells the underlying on the first available market session (regular or extended hours), burns the tokens, and pays the sale price less third-party costs and posted fees; Dinari may set size limits and defer settlement (Section 6.6). Settles in USDC, USDT.
In plain words on RIADeFi: Dinari dShares.
This file replaced an earlier record on 2026-09-30. The file called US dShares non-transferable. The Form CRS says a customer can move them to a wallet they control, while the partner guide still bars transfers. This revision records the conflict, the account terms for exits, and the limits of the on-chain checks. Superseded records.
Subscribers see which of their clients hold this program, each household’s answer against these terms, and an alert when the file changes. $49 per advisor per month, first 14 days free.
The verdict is on the memo: Dinari dShares Rejected
Other programs tokenize the same securities. Every version side by side: USFR, JAAA, MSTR, NVDA, STRC, NKE, TSLA, ASST.
Who may buy, hold, transfer, and redeem
Each answer rests on the issuer’s own words, quoted from the document named under it. Ketju re-reads each document and records whether the words are still there. Where the documents say nothing, the row says so.
- What the holder owns
No title to the share: a claim to its value plus a contractual put against Dinari.
“While you will not have any claim of right or title to the actual Underlying Asset, you do have a claim to the value of said underlying asset, at the market value that is set out on the Dinari Website when you sell the Token.”
Dinari Inc. dShares Terms and Conditions linked by Terms of Service (revised December 26, 2025) · Section 4.6(a), page 8; see also Section 6.8 · words found 2026-09-23
- Who may hold it
Non-US persons only. The terms rely on Regulation S and list the United States as an excluded jurisdiction.
“You certify that you, and any other holder of Tokens due to a Distribution by you, are not a “U.S. Person,” (a “Non-U.S. Person”) as defined under Regulation S and is not acquiring the Tokens for the account or benefit of any U.S. Person.”
Dinari Inc. dShares Terms and Conditions linked by Terms of Service (revised December 26, 2025) · Section 7.1(g), page 11-12 · words found 2026-09-23
- First purchase minimum
The documents read do not say.
Not stated in Dinari Inc. dShares Terms and Conditions linked by Terms of Service (revised December 26, 2025), Dinari Restrictions, Dinari sbt-contracts: TransferRestrictor.sol (issuer-published source).
- Account types
Individuals and companies buy directly; distributors and aggregators may buy and hold for their own end users under added terms.
“If you are making any purchase as an Aggregator, with a view to compliantly hold Tokens on behalf of one or more third party individuals, while conferring certain contractual rights upon those individuals, you also must comply with the Additional Terms for Aggregators set out at Annex 4.”
Dinari Inc. dShares Terms and Conditions linked by Terms of Service (revised December 26, 2025) · Preamble, page 1 · words found 2026-09-23
- Who it may be transferred to
For the global token, Dinari says it refuses transfers to US persons and the terms void nonconforming transfers. The separate US brokerage route has conflicting disclosures: the CRS permits a move to a wallet the customer controls, while the US partner guide still bars transfers. Neither states a US recipient allowlist; see the cited account notes.
“Dinari will not effect or register any transfer of the Product made in violation of Regulation S and, more specifically, will refuse to effect or transfer any Product made to any U.S. person.”
Dinari Restrictions · Regulatory section · words found 2026-09-23
- How a holder redeems
A sell order makes Dinari sell the underlying at market, burn the tokens, and pay the proceeds less costs in a dollar stablecoin.
“At or near the time the Sell Order is complete, Dinari will burn the Repurchase Tokens and will pay the aggregate Repurchase Price in USD-denominated stablecoin or other acceptable digital asset to the Participant’s Digital Wallet that is connected to the Participant’s Account.”
Dinari Inc. dShares Terms and Conditions linked by Terms of Service (revised December 26, 2025) · Section 6.4, page 10 · words found 2026-09-23
- Who keeps the official record
Dinari is the holder of record of the underlying shares and keeps the vote.
“Aggregators or Distributors may disclose to their Users that Tokens confer no voting rights and that Dinari is the holder of record.”
Dinari Inc. dShares Terms and Conditions linked by Terms of Service (revised December 26, 2025) · Section 4.6(d), page 8 · words found 2026-09-23
- What the issuer says it can freeze or take back
A Dinari compliance role can blacklist any address; a blacklisted address cannot send or receive dShares.
“/// @notice Accounts in `isBlacklisted` cannot send or receive tokens”
Dinari sbt-contracts: TransferRestrictor.sol (issuer-published source) · TransferRestrictor.sol, state variable isBlacklisted (repo main, last push 2026-02-06) · the site refuses automated reads; quoted as read 2026-09-23
| Fact | What the file records |
|---|---|
| Who onboards the holder | distributor |
| Voting rights | None |
| Distributions | cash |
| SIPC coverage of the wallet | No |
Who can change the record
Powers read from the deployed contracts and their verified source: the token and every contract it consults on transfer. A power recorded here is the issuer’s ability, not evidence it has been used.
| Token | Chain | Freeze a holder | Pause | Claw back | Gate holders | Change the code | Keys held by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USFR | Arbitrum | Yes | Yes | Yes | Unverified | Yes | A single key, through a contract, can claw back tokens and pause transfers and freeze a holder. A single key can change the code with no delay. |
| USFR | Base | Yes | Yes | Yes | Unverified | Yes | A single key, through a contract, can claw back tokens and pause transfers and freeze a holder. A single key can change the code with no delay. |
| USFR | Ethereum | Yes | Yes | Yes | Unverified | Yes | A single key, through a contract, can claw back tokens and pause transfers and freeze a holder. A single key can change the code with no delay. |
| USFR | Plume Mainnet | Yes | Yes | Yes | Unverified | Yes | A single key, through a contract, can claw back tokens and pause transfers and freeze a holder. A single key can change the code with no delay. |
Who holds the keys
Every current holder of each power, read from the chain on 2026-09-24. A single key is one private key: whoever holds it acts alone. A multisig needs the stated number of signers. A timelock makes every action wait, so holders can see it coming.
| Token | Chain | Key | What it can do | Held by | Address |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USFR | Arbitrum | Beacon owner | change the code | a single key | 0x06b0…60a3 |
| USFR | Arbitrum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a contract | 0xf60f…8766 |
| USFR | Arbitrum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a contract run by a single key | 0xfa92…131d |
| USFR | Arbitrum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a contract run by a single key | 0x9108…9a8c |
| USFR | Arbitrum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0x4008…bab5 |
| USFR | Arbitrum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0xc96f…9af6 |
| USFR | Arbitrum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0x7ec0…a876 |
| USFR | Arbitrum | Restrictor role | freeze a holder | a single key | 0x0111…204d |
| USFR | Base | Beacon owner | change the code | a single key | 0x06b0…60a3 |
| USFR | Base | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a contract | 0xf60f…8766 |
| USFR | Base | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a contract run by a single key | 0x63ff…39c0 |
| USFR | Base | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0x4008…bab5 |
| USFR | Base | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0xc96f…9af6 |
| USFR | Base | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0x7ec0…a876 |
| USFR | Base | Restrictor role | freeze a holder | a single key | 0x0111…204d |
| USFR | Ethereum | Beacon owner | change the code | a single key | 0x06b0…60a3 |
| USFR | Ethereum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a contract | 0xf60f…8766 |
| USFR | Ethereum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a contract run by a single key | 0xa8a4…79cb |
| USFR | Ethereum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a contract run by a single key | 0xecab…9a9e |
| USFR | Ethereum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0x4008…bab5 |
| USFR | Ethereum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0xc96f…9af6 |
| USFR | Ethereum | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0x7ec0…a876 |
| USFR | Ethereum | Restrictor role | freeze a holder | a single key | 0x0111…204d |
| USFR | Plume Mainnet | Beacon owner | change the code | a single key | 0x06b0…60a3 |
| USFR | Plume Mainnet | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a contract | 0xf60f…8766 |
| USFR | Plume Mainnet | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a contract run by a single key | 0xc157…6bab |
| USFR | Plume Mainnet | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0x4008…bab5 |
| USFR | Plume Mainnet | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0xc96f…9af6 |
| USFR | Plume Mainnet | Token operator role | mint new tokens, claw back tokens, pause transfers | a single key | 0x7ec0…a876 |
| USFR | Plume Mainnet | Restrictor role | freeze a holder | a single key | 0x0111…204d |
Arbitrum USFR: 9 contract reads at block 510472741, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-30
Read from the chain
- beacon.implementation()=0xf971cd2516eae8bb197ee21987a8421069bd0a68
- accessControl()=0xf60f689ec22fc2d485b3c734efe58538ccc28766
- TransferRestrictor_getUserAddressMetadata(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001)=(false,false,false,false,0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000)
- facetAddress(0x83609b0f)=0xabd5fc79dc9f43e5ba94869c396a80f27d6c7efa
- isTransferAllowed(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001,0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000002)=true
- eip1967.beacon=0x15436013850211acf89b656f34b426fdae01dacb
- 0x15436013850211acf89b656f34b426fdae01dacb.implementation()=0xf971cd2516eae8bb197ee21987a8421069bd0a68
- paused()=false
- accessControl()=0xf60f689ec22fc2d485b3c734efe58538ccc28766
Read from verified source
- isBlacklisted in verified source 0xf971…0a68
- pause in verified source 0xf971…0a68
- burnFrom in verified source 0xf971…0a68
- mint in verified source 0xf971…0a68
Base USFR: 4 contract reads at block 51739525, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-24
Read from the chain
- eip1967.beacon=0x6aa1bda7e764bc62589e64f371a4022b80b3c72a
- 0x6aa1bda7e764bc62589e64f371a4022b80b3c72a.implementation()=0x6658e71ab4653d398bfd12e9bf70e9a2e40de28c
- paused()=false
- accessControl()=0xf60f689ec22fc2d485b3c734efe58538ccc28766
Read from verified source
- isBlacklisted in verified source 0x6658…e28c
- pause in verified source 0x6658…e28c
- burnFrom in verified source 0x6658…e28c
- mint in verified source 0x6658…e28c
Ethereum USFR: 4 contract reads at block 26048597, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-24
Read from the chain
- eip1967.beacon=0x4062d9cbf85da2913880a3a5641cf05e85774f27
- 0x4062d9cbf85da2913880a3a5641cf05e85774f27.implementation()=0x8b2592dfb8b375cc67e448d5694b1f8b33ecc624
- paused()=false
- accessControl()=0xf60f689ec22fc2d485b3c734efe58538ccc28766
Read from verified source
- isBlacklisted in verified source 0x8b25…c624
- pause in verified source 0x8b25…c624
- burnFrom in verified source 0x8b25…c624
- mint in verified source 0x8b25…c624
Plume Mainnet USFR: 4 contract reads at block 95286215, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-24
Read from the chain
- eip1967.beacon=0xf4950a31566cdba1140058178e1aa3ec8aff3228
- 0xf4950a31566cdba1140058178e1aa3ec8aff3228.implementation()=0xbc678305546102ac32932d46eb8b4be62a168c0d
- paused()=false
- accessControl()=0xf60f689ec22fc2d485b3c734efe58538ccc28766
Read from verified source
- isBlacklisted in verified source 0xbc67…8c0d
- pause in verified source 0xbc67…8c0d
- burnFrom in verified source 0xbc67…8c0d
- mint in verified source 0xbc67…8c0d
Where it trades
| Venue | Kind |
|---|---|
| Dinari API and partner apps | issuer primary |
| Hyperliquid HyperCore spot (wrapped dShares) | dex |
How it exits
| Path | Settlement | Settles in |
|---|---|---|
| Redeem with the issuer in its window | Sell order to Dinari; Dinari sells the underlying on the first available market session (regular or extended hours), burns the tokens, and pays the sale price less third-party costs and posted fees; Dinari may set size limits and defer settlement (Section 6.6) | USDC, USDT |
- Dinari revises its dShares Terms and Conditions, in particular Sections 4.6, 6 or 6.8 on title, the repurchase right, or holder of record
- Dinari resolves the conflict between its Form CRS and US partner guide, publishes US wallet-transfer terms or a verified allowlist, or permits US transfers to other holders
- The TransferRestrictor blacklist is used against a holder, or the restrictor, beacon implementation, or MINTER/BURNER roles change on any chain
- Dinari adds or deprecates a chain, or moves tokens between chains as it did from Blast to Arbitrum on April 20, 2026
- The Bermuda segregated accounts company, its representative, or the custodian or clearing broker (Alpaca Securities) changes
- A dShare trades more than 2% from its underlying for a full session, or a repurchase is deferred under Section 6.6
- SEC or FINRA action on synthetic tokenized securities, Dinari, Inc., or Dinari Securities, LLC
Reopen conditions: events that change an answer above
What the monitor reads daily
Every control function in the table above and the contracts the token consults on transfer; the token’s on-chain supply against yesterday’s; and its market quote against yesterday’s quote. Every document quoted above is re-read too, and a quote that leaves its document reopens the file. A key that appears, disappears, or changes shape counts as a change only when the chain’s own log shows the grant, revocation, or signer change between yesterday’s block and today’s; a difference the log does not show updates this file’s key list and nothing more. A change opens a review item in the governance queue and reopens the file before any client action. Subscribers get an email naming each of their clients who hold it, with the household result.
File history
Revised 2 times since it was filed. Each superseded copy is kept as published, with the reason it was replaced.
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | Filed. |
| 2026-09-24 | Revised. Superseded to correct the allowlist and settle the Plume clawback. The Plume clawback, marked unverified, is read from verified source: the contract can take a holder’s tokens. The allowlist the file recorded as true on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, and Plume rested on function names: every transfer asks Dinari’s access-control contract, whose source is not published anywhere readable, so the allowlist is unverified on all four chains. |
| 2026-09-30 | Revised. The file called US dShares non-transferable. The Form CRS says a customer can move them to a wallet they control, while the partner guide still bars transfers. This revision records the conflict, the account terms for exits, and the limits of the on-chain checks. |
Sources
- Arbitrum phase-2 rule facet: Blockscout contract record (a contract, no verified source) · primary · accessed 2026-09-30
Supports: no verified source returned for sampled rule facet - Arbitrum phase-2 rule facet lookup (Blockscout) · primary · accessed 2026-09-30
Supports: bytecode returned without verified source for sampled rule facet - Dinari Securities Form CRS (effective August 31, 2026) · primary · accessed 2026-09-30
Supports: US self-custody wallet transfer disclosure, transfer costs do not establish an open secondary market - Dinari Securities Website Terms of Use and Customer Brokerage Agreement (July 29, 2026) · primary · accessed 2026-09-30
Supports: Part II governs brokerage; service-specific supplemental terms control conflicts, Section 20 fractional shares cannot transfer in kind; liquidation and wire exit, no token wallet allowlist stated - Dinari US Customers partner guide (last updated June 22, 2026) · primary · accessed 2026-09-30
Supports: US non-transferability conflicts with Form CRS, dedicated verified account wallets; no pooling, wrapping or DeFi - Dinari developer docs: Managing Wallets · primary · accessed 2026-09-30
Supports: external wallet linked to account by signed nonce - Dinari developer API: Create TokenTransfer · primary · accessed 2026-09-30
Supports: managed wallet sender; recipient account id; no blanket US transfer permission - Dinari Restrictions · primary · accessed 2026-09-30
Supports: Regulation S restrictions; refusal of transfers to US persons - Dinari Inc. dShares Terms and Conditions linked by Terms of Service (revised December 26, 2025) · primary · accessed 2026-09-30
Supports: Sections 2.4 and 7.1 global holder restrictions, Sections 6.4 and 6.6 global repurchase and deferral - Arbitrum dShare implementation verified source (Sourcify) · primary · accessed 2026-09-30
Supports: non-operator transfers check phase-2 rules at accessControl, metadata includes registration, restriction, block and whitelist flags, operator bypasses transfer check - Arbitrum public RPC read at block 510472741 · primary · accessed 2026-09-30
Supports: USFR beacon implementation and accessControl confirmed, phase-2 facet address 0xabd5fc79dc9f43e5ba94869c396a80f27d6c7efa, isTransferAllowed for addresses 1 and 2 returns true; address 1 has no metadata flags - Dinari, Inc. Terms and Conditions for dShares (revised 12.26.25) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: Regulation S; US persons excluded, claim to value, no title, contractual put, not ownership, Dinari holder of record, keeps vote, Bermuda segregated accounts company, repurchase mechanics and settlement, dividends in stablecoin, under $1 not paid, Annex 5 wind-down by segregated account representative - Dinari docs: Restrictions · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: refuses transfers to US persons, unsupported countries - Dinari sbt-contracts: TransferRestrictor.sol (issuer-published source) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: blacklist blocks send and receive, RESTRICTOR_ROLE - Dinari sbt-contracts: DShare.sol (issuer-published source) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: MINTER_ROLE and BURNER_ROLE, burnFrom requires allowance in published source, transfer restrictor hook - Dinari sbt-contracts: DShareFactory release deployments · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: factory addresses per chain, instrument anchors - Dinari docs: Blockchain (supported chains) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: Ethereum, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Base, HyperEVM, HyperCore, Plume, Blast and Kinto deprecated - Dinari docs: Deprecation Notices · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: Blast support ended April 20, 2026; tokens moved to Arbitrum, Kinto shutdown September 30, 2025 - Dinari docs: What are dShares · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: mint and burn only on filled brokerage order, Alpaca executes the hedge - Dinari docs: Partner Fees · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: $0.20 standard network fee per order, OTC minimum $25,000 for partners, API access from $2,000 per month - Dinari docs: Dividends · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: dividends paid in USD+, $0.10 minimum per holder - Dinari docs: US Customers · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: US tokens non-transferable and barred from DeFi, Dinari Securities onboarding and KYC, Alpaca clearing, USDC funding via Circle - Dinari Securities, LLC Form CRS (effective August 31, 2026) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: secondary record keeping token, no minimum account size, proprietary products only, Alpaca clearing firm - Dinari Securities, LLC Website Terms of Use and Customer Brokerage Agreement (July 29, 2026) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: US residents only, sole owner, personal non-business use, records kept through clearing agency - Dinari Securities, LLC Form X-17A-5 for period ending December 31, 2025 · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: SEC registration June 20, 2025, no customer accounts at December 31, 2025, total assets $251,516, Alpaca clearing deposit $30,000 - FINRA BrokerCheck: Dinari Securities, LLC (CRD 329672) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: approved 06/20/2025, 53 state registrations, no disclosures - SEC EDGAR: Dinari, Inc/TA (Form TA-1 and TA-2 filings) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: Dinari, Inc. registered transfer agent since 2022 - dinari.com home page (Global and US versions) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: marketing says dShares are stocks, available in the US and 85+ jurisdictions - Dinari price feed (CoinGecko tickers endpoint) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: prices used to rank dShares by value - SEC Divisions of Corporation Finance, Investment Management, and Trading and Markets: Statement on Tokenized Securities, January 28, 2026 · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: synthetic tokenized security: linked security, custodial model requires ownership interest