Uniswap V4
Uniswap v4 keeps v3’s concentrated-liquidity design and adds hooks, custom code that pools can run at each step of a trade, plus gas savings from a single-contract design. It held about $582M across seven chains at the 2026-08-14 survey. LP economics still include concentrated inventory rebalancing. Hooks can also change fees, curves, accounting and outside dependencies at points in a pool’s lifecycle. Uniswap Foundation’s own security framework says the Foundation does not review, audit or certify hooks. The amm-lp rule already decides the result before a review of any hook. This is a decision about the class, not an individual rejection of v4 core.
- Ships a product line without impermanent-loss exposure that merits its own review
Watched nightly: a warning on its venues or files, or a cited document that changes, reopens the memo. The first confirmation is due 2026-11-15.
The research file
The mechanism
V4 places pools in one PoolManager and uses flash accounting to net token changes before settling a transaction. It keeps v3-style concentrated liquidity. A pool may attach an immutable hook address whose callbacks run around initialization, swaps, liquidity changes and donations. Hooks can set dynamic fees, custom curves or oracle logic, or even bypass the standard concentrated-liquidity swap calculation.
Control and operating record
The PoolManager is shared core infrastructure, while each pool chooses its own permissionless hook code and admin model. Uniswap’s security framework lists risks from accounting, token handling, external calls, reentrancy, precision, upgradeability and dynamic fees. It also says plainly that the Foundation does not certify a hook’s score or safety. V4 has a shorter production record than v3. We do not need to claim an incident to apply the class rule.
The exit
Removing liquidity returns the position’s current token inventory, not the original deposit mix. An out-of-range concentrated position can be inactive and consist entirely of one token. A hook can add fees, access limits, external calls or custom accounting. The exit must therefore be tested against that exact hook, rather than judged from the Uniswap name.
Why the class rule decides
The amm-lp rule excludes the base market-making payoff, even for a pool without a hook. Hooks then create a second review for each pool. They do not fix inventory loss. This memo therefore neither condemns v4 core nor treats all hooks alike. We would reopen the review for a separate Uniswap product that does not expose the client to LP inventory.
Class rule
The amm lp class is outside the approved structures, so every protocol in it is not approved until the rule changes. The rule is about the structure, not an adverse finding about this protocol, and it is not a client instruction. The events that would reopen it are listed with the memo.
Sources
The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.
- Uniswap v4 Core white paper · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
Supports: Uniswap v4 Core white paper - Uniswap Developers — hooks and singleton architecture · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
Supports: hooks, singleton architecture - Uniswap Developers — concentrated liquidity in v3 and v4 · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
Supports: concentrated liquidity in v3, v4 - Uniswap Developers — v4 hook security framework · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
Supports: v4 hook security framework
Inherited controls
The research above describes the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The layer with the most administrative power sets the position’s effective control; that describes control, not quality or suitability.
| Chain | Verdict | Control | Control constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Approved | No freeze key | No sequencer, no upgrade key, no operator who can be compelled. Rule changes require social consensus. |
| Polygon PoS | Rejected | Mixed control | a public validator set orders transactions, but a 5-of-9 multisig can instantly upgrade staking and canonical bridge contracts, while a 5-of-8 controls custom child tokens. |
| Arbitrum One | Approved with limits | Mixed control | a single sequencer orders >99% of transactions and admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts on a ~7-day timelock. |
| Monad | Approved with limits | Governed, no freeze | the L1 has a public validator path, but its short production record, single initial client lineage, and Foundation-directed delegation keep stake and operations concentrated. |
| Base | Approved with limits | Mixed control | Coinbase, one regulated US company, operates the only sequencer, and admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts within ~7 days. |
| OP Mainnet | Rejected | Mixed control | Ethereum forced inclusion limits sequencer censorship, but the Foundation and Security Council can co-sign an immediate upgrade before a client can exit. |
| Avalanche | Approved with limits | Governed, no freeze | no party can freeze or seize C-Chain funds, but one vendor writes the only production client and Messari measured over a third of stake hosted on AWS. |