SushiSwap V3
SushiSwap V3 remains outside the current firm shelf because its structure falls within the amm-lp policy class. This is a firm-policy classification, not an adverse quality rating or a client trade instruction. The factual evidence on its mechanism, control, losses, and exits remains below.
- Ships a product line without impermanent-loss exposure that merits its own review
Watched nightly: a warning on its venues or files, or a cited document that changes, reopens the memo. The first confirmation is due 2026-11-15.
The research file
Mechanism applicability
Sushi V3 lets a liquidity provider select a fee tier and a bounded price range for a paired-asset position. Capital earns fees only while the market price stays inside that range. Sushi states that when one asset appreciates, the position sells it for the other. A position that ends outside the range may hold mostly or entirely the non-appreciating asset. Tight ranges increase capital efficiency but can amplify impermanent loss. This places the product directly under the v1 AMM-LP dossier.
Current observation and scope
The DefiLlama protocol API read on 2026-08-15 reported approximately $39.6M of SushiSwap V3 TVL across 28 nonzero chain deployments, led by Ethereum, Katana and Hemi. Current Sushi materials still tell providers to create V3 positions, select ranges, and manage them as prices move. This review establishes only the concentrated-liquidity mechanism and the current scope of the survey. Pool assets, chain eligibility, contract authorities, audits, integrations, and incidents remain outside this class review.
Control and exit applicability
A V3 position owner selects the initial range and may decrease or remove liquidity. Sushi says an out-of-range position stops earning fees, while one side of the pair is sold into the other. Removing the position returns the resulting inventory and locks in any divergence from simply holding the assets. Third-party or Sushi Smart Pool managers can automate range selection and rebalancing, but automation changes who manages the process. It does not remove LP inventory exposure or guarantee a low-loss exit.
Why the shared dossier decides
The v1 AMM-LP rule rejects advised exposure to path-dependent inventory rebalancing and impermanent loss. Concentration, fee tiers, active management, and broad deployment do not change that source of returns. They can make the loss more severe when a range is tight. Reopen only for a separately identified Sushi product with no LP inventory or impermanent-loss exposure and a return that can be reviewed on its own. Additional chains, pools, incentives, or TVL would not reopen this record.
Class rule
The amm lp class is outside the approved structures, so every protocol in it is not approved until the rule changes. The rule is about the structure, not an adverse finding about this protocol, and it is not a client instruction. The events that would reopen it are listed with the memo.
Sources
The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.
- Sushi — what V3 liquidity providers need to know · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: concentrated liquidity, fee range, one-sided position, amplified impermanent loss, active management - Sushi Academy — V3 position and exit walkthrough · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: range selection, liquidity removal, out-of-range conversion, fee cessation - Sushi Academy — current V3 liquidity guide · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: V3 position, range management, capital efficiency, APR excludes impermanent loss, Smart Pools - DefiLlama — SushiSwap V3 survey record, read 2026-08-15 · secondary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: current TVL, chain distribution, DEX category, survey perimeter
Inherited controls
The research above describes the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The layer with the most administrative power sets the position’s effective control; that describes control, not quality or suitability.
| Chain | Verdict | Control | Control constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| OP Mainnet | Rejected | Mixed control | Ethereum forced inclusion limits sequencer censorship, but the Foundation and Security Council can co-sign an immediate upgrade before a client can exit. |
| Polygon PoS | Rejected | Mixed control | a public validator set orders transactions, but a 5-of-9 multisig can instantly upgrade staking and canonical bridge contracts, while a 5-of-8 controls custom child tokens. |
| Gnosis Chain | Approved with limits | Governed, no freeze | the chain validator path is permissionless, but its xDAI and canonical bridge exposure adds an 8-of-15 governor multisig outside the base consensus grade. |
| Ethereum | Approved | No freeze key | No sequencer, no upgrade key, no operator who can be compelled. Rule changes require social consensus. |
| Avalanche | Approved with limits | Governed, no freeze | no party can freeze or seize C-Chain funds, but one vendor writes the only production client and Messari measured over a third of stake hosted on AWS. |
| Arbitrum One | Approved with limits | Mixed control | a single sequencer orders >99% of transactions and admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts on a ~7-day timelock. |
| BNB Smart Chain | Rejected | Issuer can freeze | the validator set concentrates around one company, and the chain has been halted by decision. |
| Robinhood Chain | Rejected | Mixed control | one sequencer and two permissioned validators sit beneath an emergency council and transaction filter that can defeat the normal force-inclusion backstop. |
| Base | Approved with limits | Mixed control | Coinbase, one regulated US company, operates the only sequencer, and admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts within ~7 days. |