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Staking

Sanctum Validator LSTs

Rejected The evidence weighs against it
Issued
2026-08-19
Last confirmed
2026-08-19
Next check due
2026-11-19
Research basis
Individual research
Chains
Solana · Governed, no freeze

This research assessment is adverse. This entry is confirmed distinct from Sanctum Infinity, already rejected elsewhere in this registry. It is the aggregate of over 1,300 separate single- and multi-validator liquid staking tokens Sanctum has issued for individual brands and validators (Jupiter’s jupSOL, Bybit’s bbSOL, and hundreds of smaller, thinly-liquid tokens), each backed by its own on-chain stake pool rather than a diversified basket. Sanctum itself, not the named validator, holds day-to-day pool-management authority for every one of these tokens. That is a real, disclosed safeguard against a compromised validator stealing funds. But the same structure means a client evaluating ”Sanctum Validator LSTs” as a single entry cannot actually evaluate any specific position: the risk, liquidity, and validator quality differ token by token across well over a thousand separate pools. Sanctum’s own account of the 2025-10-11 market crash confirms ”some Solana LSTs began to depeg” that day while its diversified Infinity pool stabilized and even profited. This directly shows that individual validator LSTs are more fragile under stress than a diversified pool, without naming which specific tokens depegged or by how much.

The research file

Mechanism and confirmed distinction from Sanctum Infinity

DefiLlama tracks this entry separately from sanctum-infinity and explicitly subtracts stake held inside Infinity to avoid double-counting. The two are deliberately distinct products that share a parent brand. Each validator LST is minted by a Single or Multi Validator Stake Pool program, a fork of the standard Solana stake-pool program also used by Jito and Blaze. A brand or validator launches one through a business relationship with Sanctum. The process uses a branding form and a team-managed deployment over a few days, with a one-time 100 SOL setup fee for a ”Sanctum Branded LST.” It is not a permissionless, self-service process. Default economics are a 0.1% withdrawal fee plus 10% of staking yield split between the operator and Sanctum.

Control is centralized in Sanctum, not the named validator

Sanctum’s own documentation states plainly that Sanctum holds day-to-day pool management, including staking deposited SOL and setting up each LST. It also states that this authority ”cannot steal your funds, even if compromised,” with fee changes capped and delayed with advance warning. Program-level upgrade authority sits with an 11-member multisig that includes Jupiter, Jito, Sol Strategies, Solblaze, and Sanctum and requires majority approval for any change. This is a genuinely clear and reasonably safeguarded control structure. The rejection here rests on aggregation and liquidity risk, not on concern about an undisclosed admin key.

The aggregation problem

Each branded LST is its own stake pool tied to its own validator or small validator set. A single validator’s downtime or misconduct therefore affects only that LST’s holders directly. But the DefiLlama entry this memo covers bundles well over 1,300 such pools into one TVL figure, with no way to evaluate any one pool from the aggregate. A client cannot properly review ”Sanctum Validator LSTs” as a single position. The client would need to review one specific validator’s pool, its liquidity, and its operator quality, which this entry does not and cannot do for them.

Shared, finite liquidity backstop

Instant redemption liquidity for these LSTs depends on Sanctum’s shared Reserve and Infinity pool, which Sanctum describes as ”last resort liquidity” of a few hundred thousand SOL. This is a common resource across all validator LSTs, not a buffer for one validator. A run on one thin, long-tail validator LST during a stress event could exhaust its share of that shared liquidity faster than a large, diversified LST like INF would be affected, even though each pool’s underlying stake claim is technically separate from the others.

The October 2025 stress event and comparison

Sanctum’s own blog debrief of the 2025-10-11 market-wide liquidation event states that ”some Solana LSTs began to depeg” as demand for unstaked SOL spiked, while its diversified Infinity pool stabilized prices and earned an elevated yield by unstaking roughly 300,000 SOL from reserves. It did not name which specific validator LSTs depegged or by how much. The difference between a diversified pool weathering the stress and unnamed individual LSTs failing to do so directly supports a harder line against single-validator LST exposure than against a diversified alternative. Compared with Jito Liquid Staking (a single large diversified pool) or Marinade Native and Select (both diversified delegation, separately researched in this batch), this entry’s split into thousands of pools that cannot each be reviewed creates a substantially different and worse form of risk.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

Inherited controls

The research above describes the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The layer with the most administrative power sets the position’s effective control; that describes control, not quality or suitability.

ChainVerdictControlControl constraint
SolanaApproved with limits Governed, no freeze no admin key can seize funds, but stake concentration and a sub-25 Nakamoto coefficient are the standing watch items.
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