Kava Mint
Kava Mint is the collateralized debt position system on the Kava chain. Users lock crypto collateral and mint the USDX stablecoin against it. It held $9.9 million across six pools at the 2026-08-14 survey. The registry rejects it because it is below the size floor. One practice advising 100 households moves $1M to $8M into a venue based on the same research. At this size, that book would be hard to exit without moving the market, whatever the protocol’s quality. Size alone decides the judgment, and an individual review will not open until Kava Mint clears the floor. That review would also depend on Kava’s standing in the chain registry.
- TVL sustained above the retired TVL threshold for 30 days
Watched nightly: a warning on its venues or files, or a cited document that changes, reopens the memo. The first confirmation is due 2026-11-15.
The research file
Applicability to the surveyed record
Kava Mint runs through Kava’s CDP module. A user locks one supported collateral type, mints a USD-pegged asset up to a collateral fraction, and must return and burn that debt to release the collateral. This makes the surveyed record a collateralized-debt venue. It falls under the shared v1 rule for venues below the size floor, so an individual review does not open until it clears that floor.
Current observation and perimeter
The DefiLlama API read on 2026-08-15 classified Kava Mint as a CDP on Kava and reported approximately $9.85M TVL. This single-chain footprint remains far below the shared v1 size floor, so an individual review does not open until it clears the floor. Any review also depends on Kava chain eligibility.
Control and exit applicability
Governance can change enabled collateral, price-feed identifiers, liquidation ratios, stability fees and debt ceilings. A user can withdraw collateral only while the CDP stays above its liquidation ratio or after repaying the debt and fees. The system seizes and auctions undercollateralized positions. A price-feed failure can suspend withdrawals, and unrecovered system debt can trigger governance-token debt auctions.
Why the class rule decides
The shared v1 rule for venues below the size floor decides the judgment. Open an individual review only after TVL clears the size floor for 30 days and Kava is eligible. Then review the USDX peg and liquidity, each collateral and oracle, governance and emergency authority, parameters and debt ceilings, audits and incidents, liquidation and auction performance, system bad debt, collateral exit under stress, and named CDP alternatives.
Research status
This is a capacity-unproven record for Kava Mint, not a quality rejection or approval. Reported TVL says how big the venue is, not what the client owns, who can change the rules, or how a position exits at a proposed size. The individual review opens when the protocol clears the size floor.
Sources
The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.
- Kava — CDP module overview · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: CDP mechanism, collateral lock, stable-asset minting, debt repayment, collateral auctions - Kava — CDP concepts and controls · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: governance parameters, price-feed dependency, liquidation, debt auctions, collateral exit, fees - DefiLlama — Kava Mint survey record · secondary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: current TVL, Kava, CDP category, survey perimeter
Inherited controls
The research above describes the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The layer with the most administrative power sets the position’s effective control; that describes control, not quality or suitability.
| Chain | Verdict | Control | Control constraint |
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