KETJU Research

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Dollar lending

Clearpool Lending

Not approved Off-chain credit is outside the approved structures
Issued
2026-08-14
Last confirmed
2026-08-14
Next check due
2026-11-15
Chains
Ethereum · No freeze key, Base · Mixed control, Polygon PoS · Mixed control, OP Mainnet · Mixed control, Mantle · Issuer can freeze, Avalanche · Governed, no freeze, Arbitrum One · Mixed control, Flare · Governed, no freeze

Clearpool Dynamic and Prime lend to whitelisted institutional borrowers without posted collateral. The protocol API read on 2026-08-15 separated only about $256,000 supplied from approximately $10.36M borrowed, principally on Ethereum; staking and historical deployment labels are not lender liquidity. The shared v1 off-chain-credit dossier therefore controls regardless of scale: borrower books, legal recovery and repayment remain off-chain, while cpToken exit depends on pool cash and borrower performance.

The research file

Mechanism applicability

Clearpool Dynamic lets lenders fund whitelisted institutional borrowers without posted collateral and receive pool-specific cpTokens. Interest follows utilization, while third-party credit assessment and a partial-recovery reserve address but do not eliminate default loss. Prime similarly transfers uncollateralized loan assets directly to borrower wallets.

Current observation and perimeter

The DefiLlama API read on 2026-08-15 reported approximately $256,000 supplied and $10.36M borrowed. About $10.30M of borrowing was on Ethereum and $49,794 on Mantle; supplied balances were approximately $103,202 Base, $67,866 Ethereum, $40,026 Polygon, $28,473 OP Mainnet, $16,494 Mantle and de minimis Avalanche and Arbitrum. Flare and historical Polygon zkEVM balances were zero. The separately reported $953,065 Ethereum staking balance is not lender liquidity.

Control and exit applicability

Governance sets Dynamic interest parameters using oracle input, while borrower admission depends on whitelisting and credit assessment. cpToken redemption is subject to pool cash; once funds sit in a borrower wallet, lender exit depends on repayment or recovery. A protection reserve offers partial recovery rather than principal assurance.

Why the class rule decides

The shared v1 off-chain-credit dossier controls because borrower admission, underwriting, financial disclosure, repayment and legal recovery depend on identified institutions and off-chain processes. Reopen only after a named pool supplies decision-grade borrower and legal-entity disclosure, independently verified financials, enforceable recovery rights, reserve and concentration evidence, and proposed-size stressed redemption against a transparent overcollateralized on-chain lending alternative.

Class rule

The off chain credit class is outside the approved structures, so every protocol in it is not approved until the rule changes. The rule is about the structure, not an adverse finding about this protocol, and it is not a client instruction. The events that would reopen it are listed with the memo.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

Inherited controls

The research above describes the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The layer with the most administrative power sets the position’s effective control; that describes control, not quality or suitability.

ChainVerdictControlControl constraint
EthereumApproved No freeze key No sequencer, no upgrade key, no operator who can be compelled. Rule changes require social consensus.
BaseApproved with limits Mixed control Coinbase, one regulated US company, operates the only sequencer, and admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts within ~7 days.
Polygon PoSRejected Mixed control a public validator set orders transactions, but a 5-of-9 multisig can instantly upgrade staking and canonical bridge contracts, while a 5-of-8 controls custom child tokens.
OP MainnetRejected Mixed control Ethereum forced inclusion limits sequencer censorship, but the Foundation and Security Council can co-sign an immediate upgrade before a client can exit.
MantleRejected Issuer can freeze the team can push instant upgrades; there is no exit window a client could use.
AvalancheApproved with limits Governed, no freeze no party can freeze or seize C-Chain funds, but one vendor writes the only production client and Messari measured over a third of stake hosted on AWS.
Arbitrum OneApproved with limits Mixed control a single sequencer orders >99% of transactions and admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts on a ~7-day timelock.
FlareApproved with limits Governed, no freeze consensus entry is permissionless, but the Foundation monopolizes governance proposals and manually executes some approved changes.
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