3Jane Lending

Ketju rejects the individual review of the combined 3Jane record. 3Jane tracks two different receipts. During the current risk-off bootstrap, senior USD3 remains in Aave and has no merchant credit exposure; junior sUSD3 is locked first-loss capital exposed to merchant advances that posted collateral does not prefund. DefiLlama separately records about $10.0M top-level TVL and $65.0M borrowed, not $75M of depositor TVL. One record cannot fairly put USD3 in the off-chain-credit class while hiding that this class determines the treatment of sUSD3.

Review triggers: events that reopen the verdict
• Publishes product-level TVL and liquidity for USD3 and sUSD3 and clearly activates or retires the planned phase-two senior credit exposure
• sUSD3 publishes independently audited borrower cohorts, concentration, delinquency, default and recovery history through a stressed cycle

Watched nightly: a warning on its venues or files, or a cited document that changes, reopens the memo. The first confirmation is due 2026-11-15.

The research file

Mechanism

USDC suppliers choose USD3 or sUSD3. Official current docs say phase-one USD3 is fully backed by Aave/idle reserves and kept outside credit risk. Locked sUSD3 backs merchant drawdowns, earns unsecured-credit yield, and takes the first losses. Borrowing capacity uses bank, exchange, and on-chain data sent through zkTLS proofs.

Control and operating evidence

3Jane sets underwriting models, borrower access, advance terms, and pool-wide limits for merchant credit, total debt, utilization, rates, tranche ratios, locks, and withdrawal windows. Its current global-config documentation says the protocol owner can change those values through setConfig and pause the market. Those powers directly affect money and liquidity, so research must identify the live owner, signer threshold, and any delay. Posted collateral does not prefund merchant credit. The legal-recourse documentation instead describes a security interest in purchased yield, UCC-1 perfection, pursuit of onchain, exchange, and traditional assets, and eventual collection-agency auctions. Recovery thus depends on off-chain enforcement and available assets, not an immediate collateral liquidation.

Exit consequences

USD3 redemption is available on demand but limited by Aave liquidity during bootstrap. sUSD3 has a one-month lock and can redeem only unused junior-tranche liquidity; merchant utilization reduces available cash. Defaults consume sUSD3 before any future risk-on exposure for the senior tranche.

Assurance, incidents and recovery evidence

3Jane publishes reviews by Veridise, Sherlock, and Electisec dated from August 2025 through May 2026. Those reports help define the contract scope, but this memo has not matched every finding to the live implementation or confirmed that they cover underwriting models, zkTLS inputs, and owner-set parameters. The primary materials reviewed showed no seasoned record of defaults, recoveries, or withdrawal stress by cohort. That does not establish a clean history. The protocol is young; collections may use negotiated cure, UCC remedies, courts, or licensed collection agencies, and actual timing and recovery can differ greatly from contractual rights. A file fit for a decision needs borrower concentration, delinquency transitions, write-downs, recoveries, and cash available to each receipt.

Comparison and product-level decision

Compare bootstrap USD3 with supplying USDC directly to the named Aave market. Both depend on Aave liquidity, but USD3 adds 3Jane contracts, owner-set parameters, and a planned lifecycle change. Compare sUSD3 instead with a named private-credit or off-chain-credit product because it provides first-loss capital for merchant advances and depends on underwriting and collections. Direct Aave exposure does not take on merchant defaults. A credit product does not become cash-like because its senior receipt now sits idle. Ketju rejects the combined record until separate product records state those different claims, controls, yields, and exits clearly.

Why the individual verdict is rejected

The current USD3 mechanism does not fit off-chain credit, while sUSD3 clearly does. The combined record lacks product-level TVL and would misstate one side if forced into a single class. Review requires separate USD3 and sUSD3 records, plus proof of when any planned phase-two senior credit exposure actually begins.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

• 3Jane — protocol and credit-proof overview · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: zero-collateral credit, zkTLS data, USD3, merchant borrowers
• 3Jane — protocol white paper · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: Aave idle capital, senior claim, sUSD3 first loss, reserve-limited withdrawal
• 3Jane — Advance Agreement · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: merchant payment obligations, advance terms, off-chain enforcement
• 3Jane Docs — current supplier bootstrap phases · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: USD3 risk-off phase, sUSD3 credit exposure, one-month lock, redemption liquidity
• 3Jane Docs — protocol global configuration · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: owner setConfig authority, market pause, debt and utilization caps, tranche and withdrawal parameters
• 3Jane Docs — audit inventory · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: Veridise review, Sherlock reviews, Electisec reviews, audit dates
• 3Jane Docs — merchant default legal recourse · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: UCC-1 security interest, court enforcement, collection-agency auction, recovery paths
• DefiLlama — 3Jane survey record · secondary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: top-level TVL, borrowed amount, Ethereum deployment, uncollateralized-lending category

Inherited controls

The research above describes the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The layer with the most administrative power sets the position’s effective control; that describes control, not quality or suitability.